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Abstract 
 
Numerous recent studies, e.g. EU Commission (2004a), Baele et al. (2004), Adam et al. 
(2002), and the research pooled in ECB-CFS (2005), Gaspar, Hartmann, and Sleijpen 
(2003), have documented progress in EU financial integration from a micro-level view. 
This  paper contributes to this research by identifying groups of  financially integrated 
countries from a holistic, macro-level view. It calculates cross-sectional dispersions, and 
innovates by applying an inter-temporal cluster analysis to eight euro area countries for the 
period 1995-2002. The indicators employed represent the money, government bond and 
credit markets. Our results show that euro countries were divided into two stable groups of 
financially more closely integrated countries in the pre-EMU period. Back then, geographic 
proximity and country size might have played a role. This situation has changed remarkably 
with the  euro's introduction. EMU has led to a shake-up both in the number and 
composition of  groups. The evidence puts a question mark behind using Germany as a 
benchmark in the post-EMU period. The ¯ndings suggest as well that ¯nancial integration 
takes place in waves. Stable periods and periods of intense transition alternate. Based on the 
notion of 'maximum similarity', the results suggest that there exist 'maximum similarity 
barriers'. It  takes extraordinary events, such as EMU, to push the degree of ¯nancial 
integration beyond these barriers. The research encourages policymakers to move forward 
courageously in the post-FSAP era, and provides comfort that the substantial di®erences 
between the current and potentially new euro states can be overcome. The analysis could be 
extended to the new EU member countries, to the global level, and to additional indicators. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 1
"(...) some countries could, and perhaps should take the initiative to go forwards.
(...) They might be the EU founder members (...) or even a mixed group. (...)
The union train cannot always move at the speed of the slowest wagon."a
aRomano Prodi, in: La Repubblica (2004).
1 Introduction
1.1 Research motivation
It is important to measure the progress of ¯nancial integration from a variety
of perspectives.1 Direct, qualitative approaches identify and analyze economic
and regulatory barriers, whereas indirect, quantitative approaches analyze the
observable consequences of these barriers.2 Micro-level analysis focuses on a sep-
arate assessment of, for example, individual ¯nancial market segments, value
chain elements, and e±ciency indicators, whereas macro-level analysis performs
a simultaneous analysis of these areas. All approaches provide insights into the
impact of integration initiatives, and provide guidance for the drivers of integra-
tion, namely market forces, collective action within the market community and
public authorities,3 in their targeting of future action.
From a quantitative micro-level view, the progress of EU ¯nancial integration
are by now well-documented. A rich literature on EU ¯nancial integration has de-
veloped over time, and a broad set of sophisticated methods and indicators have
been applied.4 The numerous ¯ndings are re°ected in a variety of recent studies,
such as the taking stock of indicators in the EU Commission's ¯rst Financial
Integration Monitor,5 and in the manifold publications of the ECB-CFS research
network on EU ¯nancial integration,6 to name but a few. This research shows
"that di®erent market sectors have attained di®erent levels of integration."7 In
fact, "(...) 'integrated wholesale markets, fragmented retail markets' is how most
mainstream analyses would probably summarize the state of the euro area bank-
ing business."8 Some of the remaining challenges and de¯ciencies are currently
being tackled within the framework of the FSAP, but the debate on a post-FSAP
agenda has already begun.9 "Such a debate naturally has to start with a (...)
review of the accomplishments to date."10
1"Conclusions on the progress of integration (...) cannot be based on the observation of one single indicator
or trend." (EU Commission (2004a), p. 4)
2See SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 35®.
3See ECB (2003a), p. 53®.
4See, among other studies, EU Commission (2004a), Baele et al. (2004), EU Commission (2003), ECB (2003a),
Hartmann et al. (2003), Cabral, Dierick, and Vesala (2002), and Adam et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of
methodologies, indicators and results. See also Section 2.
5See EU Commission (2004a), and its background documents EU Commission (2004b), EU Commission
(2004c), EU Commission (2003), and EU Commission (2002).
6See ECB-CFS (2005), and Gaspar, Hartmann, and Sleijpen (2003).
7Baele et al. (2004), p. 81.
8Manna (2004), p. 7.
9FSAP = Financial Services Action Plan. See the FSAP progress reports, e.g. EU Commission (2004d),
its predecessors, and Expert Group on Banking (2004), Securities Expert Group (2004), Expert Group on
Insurance and Pensions (2004), Asset Management Expert Group (2004). See EU Commission (2005a) and EU
Commission (2005b) for a detailed, frequently updated overview of the progress of the FSAP.
10Walter (2004), p. 3.1 INTRODUCTION 2
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the above research by shedding further
light on the EU ¯nancial integration process from a holistic, macro-level perspec-
tive. Although the perspective is di®erent, the underlying motivation, i.e. the
assessment of the status quo, progress and trends in EU ¯nancial integration,
corresponds to that of the micro-level research. However, our research questions
di®er slightly:
² 1) Are there stable groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries?
² 2) Does a Europe of two or more ¯nancial integration speeds exist?
² 3) Do some EU countries form a 'Core Europe'?
² 4) Is the choice of Germany as a benchmark justi¯ed?
In answering these research questions, we hypothesize that the barriers to
¯nancial integration - regulatory, legal, tax-related, geographical, cultural, and
historic - will be visible in group building, if it exists. Strong 'mobility bar-
riers' are likely to prevail in fragmented EU ¯nancial markets, leading to the
formation of stable groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries. The
well-documented reduction and removal of these barriers over time should have
reduced the di®erences between these groups as well as between individual coun-
tries. In turn, this reduction in di®erences, i.e. this ¯nancial integration process,
should translate into a change of the groups' composition. With increasing de-
grees of ¯nancial integration, it could be expected that countries leave their tra-
ditional group, join other groups, or form new groups.
The insights provided by our research are of value for future EU policy dis-
cussions and initiatives. Documenting whether and how 'old' EU member states
have formed stable, ¯nancially more closely integrated groups in the past might
be helpful in the current e®orts to fully integrate the ten 'new' EU member states
into the emerging EU ¯nancial system.11 Our research results add to the discus-
sion of whether the undisputable di®erences between 'old' and 'new' EU member
states, and, more narrowly, between 'old' and potentially 'new' euro countries,
might diminish as the future of EU ¯nancial integration unfolds. They may also
serve as a 'success control': The e®ects of major integration initiatives, such as
the European Monetary Union (EMU), should become visible in group building.
Additional observations underscore that answering our research questions is of
academic, regulatory, and political relevance. The above statement from Romani
Prodi, the Commission's President until 2004, mirrors the, in some political ¯elds
heated, debate on a Europe of two or more integration speeds.12 The German
Christian Democrats' Wolfgang SchÄ auble and Karl Lamers published a pamphlet
as early as 1994 in which they called for a 'Kerneuropa' (= core Europe).13 Ger-
man Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer advocated strongly for an 'Avantgarde' of
11Eight CEE countries joined the EU alongside Malta and Cyprus on 01 May 2004.
12Prodi refers to the EU Constitution, which was signed in October 2004, but still needs rati¯cation.
13See SchÄ auble and Lamers (1994).1 INTRODUCTION 3
countries to lead the EU in 2000,14 and Grabbe and Guerot (2004) have asked
"Could a hard core run the enlarged EU?"15 in the title of a recent publication.16
Previous research has pointed to the existence of groups of ¯nancially more
closely integrated countries. Gualandri (2000) claims that "in an integrated mar-
ket, interest margins will tend to converge towards the lower levels found in (...)
the Deutschmark area plus France (the so-called 'Core Europe') (...) in contrast
to the other countries or 'Other Europe'."17 SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) con-
clude that their results point "to an integrated 'core' of countries, namely Spain,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Belgium to which France and Finland have some
link."18 Kleimeier and Sander (2002) ¯nd di®ering results for countries "dubbed
as 'non-core EMU' such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (...) [and] for core-
EMU countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands."19
Manna (2004) investigates the role of border sharing since "this o®ers an in-
sight about the possibility that the euro market is in fact the sum of several
regional markets."20 Boreiko (2002) applies various economic criteria to assess
the readiness of CEE countries to join EMU. He identi¯es "three groups of tran-
sition countries,"21 and ¯nds that "during the period 1998-2001, we observe (...)
four groups"22 with respect to Maastricht criteria adherence. Emiris (2002) ex-
amines equity markets and documents di®erences in integration speeds within
the EU by concluding that "there appear to be di®erences in timing between
countries."23
The research introduces a methodologically powerful, yet intuitive tool to the
¯nancial integration literature. Besides calculating cross-section dispersions sta-
tistics, it employs the Ward algorithm as a clustering technique to identify ho-
mogenous groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries. Cluster analysis
best ¯ts our research objectives as this methodology, among other advantages,
aims to identify homogeneous groups, strives to maximize heterogeneity between
groups and does not assume objects to be independent from each other. Trans-
planting this idea into the ¯nancial integration literature, it follows that countries
that are assigned to the same group are more 'similar' and, thus, ¯nancially more
closely integrated with each other than those countries which do not belong to
this group. An increase in similarity over time, or a decrease in distances between
countries, indicates that a ¯nancial integration process is taking place. This pa-
per innovates in that an inter-temporal cluster analysis has, to our knowledge,
not yet been found in the literature.
14See Fischer (2000). He later retreated from this idea. See Berliner Zeitung (2004).
15Grabbe and Guerot (2004).
16See also Schneider (2004).
17Gualandri (2000), p. 253.
18SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 54.
19Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 20f.
20Manna (2004), p. 24.
21Boreiko (2002), p. 3.
22Boreiko (2002), p. 7.
23Emiris (2002), p. 219.1 INTRODUCTION 4
Our de¯nition of ¯nancial integration innovates in two regards: It is based
on the concept of distances, or similarities, and it lifts the de¯nition of ¯nancial
integration to the aggregate level of individual EU member states. Instead of 'full'
integration, 'maximum similarity' forms the core of our de¯nition. Our study
employs price-based indicators that have been used in the ¯nancial integration
literature before, i.e. national interest rates, for the money, government bond and
credit markets. It covers eight euro area countries, and examines the period 1995
to 2002.24
Some words of caution seem warranted. First, we aim at incorporating as many
indicators as possible to put the research on a broad footing. Little data is avail-
able that satis¯es our requirements, i.e. all data points must be available for all
countries, all periods and of 'good' quality. The data employed best ful¯lls these
criteria. Second, we have run a separate analysis that includes additional indica-
tors. Yet, data points of the additional indicators were missing. An application
of data augmentation algorithms to complete the missing data points violates our
data quality requirements. It puts noise to the analysis which is why we restrict
the research to 'clean'data. Third, we use ECB data for the credit market. This
is, to our knowledge, the most reliable data available, but it is not risk-adjusted.
Adjusting for risk is complex with respect to credit market rates, and risk ad-
justments threaten to seriously distort our analysis. Fourth, to our knowledge,
this is the ¯rst attempt to measure progress in EU ¯nancial integration from a
macro-perspective by employing an inter-temporal cluster analysis. Econome-
tricians could raise concerns about the statistical rigorousness of the clustering
procedure. However, in our research setting, we consider it an advantage that
cluster analysis leaves room for interpretation, and that the interpretation is not
dominated by the method itself.25 We take these limitations into account, and are
con¯dent that the results of our approach provide fruitful answers to the outlined
research questions, and that our research serves as a starting point to stimulate
subsequent methodological extensions.
1.2 Structure of paper
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on measuring
EU ¯nancial integration. Section 3 introduces our de¯nition of ¯nancial inte-
gration. We then discuss the set of indicators used, provide an overview of the
cluster algorithm and its associated diagnostics, and outline the advantages and
limitations of cluster analysis in identifying groups of ¯nancially more closely in-
tegrated countries. Section 4 applies cluster analysis to eight euro area countries,
discusses the ¯ndings, and assesses their implications. Section 5 concludes and
points to possible future research extensions.
24Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were excluded due to data unavailability.
25"Rudimentary, exploratory procedures are often quite useful in understanding the complex nature of multi-
variate relationships (...), for assessing dimensionality, identifying outliers, and suggesting interesting hypotheses
concerning relationships." (Johnson and Wichern (1998), p. 726)2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 5
2 EU ¯nancial integration: Overview of literature
2.1 Indicators for measuring ¯nancial integration
The "e®ective interplay between market forces, collective action within the mar-
ket community to overcome coordination problems, and action by public author-
ities,"26 the latter via numerous harmonization, liberalization and deregulation
initiatives,27 is key for bringing about EU ¯nancial integration. As the intro-
duction has already highlighted, a large body of research on EU ¯nancial inte-
gration has developed over time, and broad sets of sophisticated indicators have
been applied to assess the degree and evolution of EU ¯nancial integration. Di-
rect, qualitative approaches to measuring ¯nancial integration analyze economic
and regulatory barriers, whereas indirect, quantitative approaches analyze the
observable consequences of these barriers.28 Our research follows the indirect,
quantitative approach.
Table 1 provides an overview of the wide variety of statistical indicators that
are employed in the literature to indirectly measure the degrees of integration in
EU ¯nancial markets. This overview is based on the recommendations and ¯nd-
ings of EU Commission (2004a), Baele et al. (2004), EU Commission (2003), and
Adam et al. (2002) whose studies come closest to a comprehensive assessment of
EU ¯nancial market integration. Following Baele et al. (2004), three categories
of indicators can be distinguished: a) price-based indicators, b) news-based indi-
cators, and c) quantity-based indicators.29
Price-based indicators, which can be further classi¯ed into the two categories
a) yield-based measures and b) country e®ects, typically include the convergence
of interest rates, which "measure the 'cost of money' in ¯nancial markets."30 The
rationale behind these indicators is that arbitrage should ensure that the law of
one price holds in perfectly integrated ¯nancial markets, i.e. prices of identical
assets that are traded in di®erent country markets are equal.31 Table 1 outlines
that indicators based on quantities, either stock data or °ow data, comprise data
on international capital °ows, portfolio compositions, cross-border lending and
foreign shares in total issuing activity.32
26ECB (2003a), p. 53.
27"The general model of ¯nancial integration in Europe is that of the 'single passport'. This concept combines
minimum harmonization, mutual recognition and home country control." (Schmidt (2001), p. 435) See Dermine
(2003), DB Research (2002), Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 2®., for a review of the transformation of European
banking from 1957 to the present.
28See SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 35®. For example, the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions of IMF (2003) provides an overview of barriers to international capital °ows.
29See Baele et al. (2004), p. 12®. Adam et al. (2002) identify additionally d) indicators based on economic
decisions of households and ¯rms, and e) indicators of institutional di®erences. See Adam et al. (2002). Fur-
thermore, the EU Commission (2004a) provides indicators related to the e±ciency of ¯nancial integration, looks
at the re-organization of value chains at EU level, and examines changes in ¯nancial stability and competitive
structures. See EU Commission (2004a).
30EU Commission (2004c), p. 2.
31See SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 37. The three interest parity conditions a) covered nominal interest
parity, b) ex ante uncovered interest parity, and c) ex ante real interest parity are often employed to assess the
degree of ¯nancial integration. As a result of the euro's introduction, "tests for interest parity in order to assess
the degree of ¯nancial market integration within EMU make no sense." (SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 38)
32The arguably most known quantity-based indicator was introduced by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who
analyze correlations between investment and saving.2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 6
Market segment Indicators
(1) Price-based indicators
Yield-based measures Country e®ects
a) Money - Spread between interest rates - Dispersion of rates across
- Cross-sectional dispersion countries vs. within countries
b) Corporate - Size and signi¯cance of country - Country vs. rating e®ects within
bond e®ect for corporate bond spreads the country (rating) portfolio
- Cross-sectional dispersion in
country e®ect
- Proportion of cross-sectional vari-
ance explained by country e®ect
c) Govern- - Spread between yields using a
ment bond reference asset
- ¼-convergence
- Cross-sectional dispersion
d) Equity - Sector vs. country e®ects
e) Credit - Spread between interest rates
using a reference country
interest rate
- Margins using comparable
market rates
- ¼-convergence
- Cross-sectional dispersion
(2) News-based indicators (3) Quantity-based indicators
a) Money - Cross-border lending activities
- Resort to standing facilities
- Repo market: number of trades
b) Corporate - Share of assets invested in bond
bond funds with a European-wide
investment strategy
c) Govern- - Percentage of asset price change - Share of assets invested in bond
ment bond explained by common factors funds with a European-wide
investment strategy
d) Equity - Increase in common news - Asset share of euro area invest-
components in equity returns ment funds with non-domestic
and European horizon
- Share of non-euro area equity in
total equity portfolio of pension
fund and life insurance sectors
e) Credit - Percentage of interest rate change - Cross-border loans to non-banks
explained by common factors and interbank loans
- Cross-border securities holdings
issued by banks and non-banks
Source: Adapted from Baele et al. (2004), p. 22. See also Table 4.1 in Adam et al. (2002), p. 61,
and Table 1 in SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 36.
Table 1: Overview of integration indicators for di®erent market segments2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 7
In comparison with quantity-based indicators, price-based indicators yield var-
ious methodological bene¯ts. They are particularly useful for the analysis of
long-term integration processes, since their application allows for the detection of
trends. Another important advantage is that new integration measures are more
rapidly visible in price-based than in quantity-based indicators. In addition,
Adam et al. (2002) point out that "price indicators are more easily available and
more accurate. (...) Price-based indicators also have a clear-cut interpretation,
which is often lacking for quantity indicators when based on °ow data."33
One of the main reasons for the inferiority of °ow data is that "the presence
of cross-border ¯nancial °ows is neither a necessary nor a su±cient condition
for ¯nancial market integration."34 Quantity indicators that are instead based
on stock data can be more straightforwardly interpreted.35 The EU Commission
(2004c) argues in favor of the use of quantity indicators, since they "can give us
an indication of foreign presence in domestic markets, [and of] access of residents
to other Member States markets."36 Still, the Commission acknowledges that
"the mere presence of cross-border activity in a certain market segment does not
deliver absolute proof of market integration, (...) it is an indication that markets
are contestable to some degree."37
Price-based indicators have limitations that are important in interpreting our
research results.38 The EU Commission (2004c) points out that a "convergence of
interest rates may be observed independently of any signi¯cant increase in cross-
border lending (...) [and] can be due to perceived contestability of markets".39 In
addition, price-based indicators refer to the law of one price, yet Padoa-Schioppa
(2000) emphasizes that the "law of one price, which is the usual criterion for iden-
tifying the emergence of a uni¯ed market, provides only limited help in assessing
the extent of integration in banking,"40 since ¯nancial products are rarely perfect
substitutes. "The law may fail to hold true because of factors such as transport
or transaction costs, consumer switching costs or barriers to entry, maintaining
market segmentation."41 In addition, "in the context of retail banking the case
for the law of one price is (..) not so straightforward. (...) Rather, credits are
characterized by heterogeneity caused by risk di®erences, cultural in°uences in
bank-client relationship, [and] country-speci¯c strategic bank behavior in order
to cope with informational imperfections (...)."42
33Adam et al. (2002), p. 1.
34Adam et al. (2002), p. 13. "It is not necessary because the law of one price may hold even in the absence
of cross-border °ows: according to the theory of contestable markets, potential competition arising from the
threat of entry by foreign banks may be su±cient to enforce the same terms for borrowers in di®erent countries.
It is also not su±cient because credit markets may fail to be integrated despite high cross-border credit °ows.
Such °ows might fail to equalize domestic and foreign interest rates, e.g. because banks' market power may vary
across countries." (Adam et al. (2002), p. 13)
35See Adam et al. (2002), p. 13.
36EU Commission (2004c), p. 2.
37EU Commission (2004c), p. 2.
38We restrict the analysis to six price-based indicators. See Section 3.2.
39EU Commission (2004c), p. 7. A perceived contestability can result from the threat of entry by partner
country institutions or high competition between local incumbents.
40Padoa-Schioppa (2000), p. 1.
41Cabral, Dierick, and Vesala (2002), p. 7.
42Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 8.2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 8
2.2 Degree of integration in EU ¯nancial market segments
We discuss the observed degrees of ¯nancial integration separately to bring order
to the large body of available research. In a broad classi¯cation, EU whole-
sale ¯nancial markets can be distinguished from EU retail markets. SchÄ uler and
Heinemann (2002) even argue that "in the context of measuring integration, the
distinction between wholesale capital markets and retail ¯nancial markets be-
comes crucial."43 In a narrow view, the ¯nancial markets segments a) derivatives
market, b) money market, c) bond market, d) equity market, and e) credit market
can be identi¯ed.44 This separation follows the literature, since many research
studies, as Table 2 shows, either focus on a few market segments or on speci¯c
aspects of one single segment.
Various ¯nancial market segments are perfectly integrated within the euro
area. The foreign exchange market, which forms an additional category, is one
obvious example. All exchange rate risk has been eliminated with the euro's
introduction on 01 January 1999.45 The degree of ¯nancial integration in most
derivatives market sub-segments is high as well. Trichet (2003) points out that
the introduction of EONIA46 in 1999 and "its adoption as a benchmark on the
interest rate swap market has been an important factor for the integration of
this particular market segment. Furthermore, (...) the market for interest rate
swaps indexed on the EONIA is the most liquid and deepest of its kind in the
world."47 This assessment is supported by the ECB (2003a), which concludes that
the "overnight interest rate swap market (...) [and] derivatives markets (...) can
also be said to be perfectly integrated,"48 and by the EU Commission (2004c),
which argues that the past years "have been marked by the development of large
pan-European organized markets for futures and derivatives (...), with its major
functions fully integrated."49
The money market has, as Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) put it, a "split per-
sonality (...), [since ] the impact of EMU has been considerable, but the progress
towards integration (...) has been uneven across di®erent market segments."50
There was an "almost immediate integration of the money market - concern-
ing both the interbank market and the derivatives market - at the beginning
of 1999,"51 but Baele et al. (2004) show that "not all segments of the market
have yet reached the same level of what might be called 'near-perfect' integra-
tion."52 It is important to distinguish between the unsecured and the secured
parts of the money market. The EU Commission (2004c) underscores that the
43SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 34.
44These market segments can be further broken down according to, for example, transaction sizes, instruments
and client groups.
45The commodities market may be identi¯ed as a seventh market segment. Most sub-segments of this market,
i.e. gold, oil, soybeans, wheat, etc., are fully integrated not only on an EU level, but globally.
46EONIA = Euro OverNight Index Average.
47Trichet (2003), p. 1.
48ECB (2003a), p. 63.
49EU Commission (2004c), p. 23.
50Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001), p. 2.
51Trichet (2003), p. 1.
52Baele et al. (2004), p. 33.2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 9
Study / Author Investigated ¯nancial market segment
EU Commission (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) Money, derivatives, ¯xed income,
EU Commission (2003) equity, credit markets
Baele et al. (2004) Money, government bond, corporate bond,
equity, banking / credit markets
Manna (2004) Wholesale and retail markets
ECB (2003a) Money, government bond, equity markets
Hartmann et al. (2003) Money, bond, stock markets, banking
Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003) Government bond, equity markets
European Banking Federation (2003) Money, bond, equity, retail credit markets
SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) Retail and wholesale ¯nancial markets
Cabral, Dierick, and Vesala (2002) Wholesale-, capital market-, retail banking
Eppendorfer et al. (2002) Market access strategies
Adam et al. (2002) Bond, stock, credit markets, economic decisions
of households & ¯rms, institutional di®erences
Emiris (2002) Stock market
EU Commission (2002) Wholesale and retail markets
Kleimeier and Sander (2002) Retail credit market
Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) Money, bond, equity, foreign exchange markets
Ayuso and Blanco (2000) Stock market
Source: Own illustration, own compilation. See also Table 2 in Manna (2004), p. 12.
Table 2: Overview of selected recent studies on measuring EU ¯nancial integration
"euro-denominated interbank unsecured money market is an integrated market
(...), [whereas] secured money markets are less integrated."53 These results are
re°ected in a variety of other recent studies. To name but a few, the ECB (2003a)
¯nds that the "unsecured euro overnight market has been highly integrated since
the start of Stage Three of EMU,"54 Hartmann et al. (2003) emphasize that "the
euro area money market is characterized by a (...) highly integrated unsecured
deposit market and by a (...) less integrated repo market,"55 and the European
Banking Federation (2003) even argues that "the market for unsecured interbank
deposits (...) is highly integrated (...), the secured money markets (...) remain
53EU Commission (2004c), p. 20f.
54ECB (2003a), p. 62.
55Hartmann et al. (2003), p. 192.2 EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 10
largely fragmented."56 However, integration in the secured part is advancing, and
"evidence of this progress can be seen in the creation of the EUREPO bench-
mark index, or in the development of a standardized legal document known as
the 'European Master Agreement'."57
The ECB (2003a) points out that the lower degree of ¯nancial integration
in the secured money market is broadly comparable to the degree of ¯nancial
integration in "the bond markets in general and the government bond market
segment in particular."58 This view is con¯rmed by Hartmann et al. (2003), who
¯nd, as well, that the "bond market has converged rapidly (...), although to a
lesser extent than the money market."59 In particular, the euro has played an
important role for the integration in the bond market. Galati and Tsatsaronis
(2001) speak in the context of the euro's impact on bond market integration of a
"success story,"60 and the European Banking Federation (2003) emphasizes that
"EMU and the arrival of the euro resulted in a dramatic integration of the 12
national bond markets of the participating Member States."61
Adam et al. (2002) argue that "convergence is achieved in the (...) government
bond market,"62 but others emphasize that the euro government bond market is
not perfectly integrated. For example, Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003) show that
the "evolution of government bond markets (...) has been spectacular. (...) Lower
spreads (...), lower interest rate volatility (...), but (...) failure of ¯nancial inte-
gration."63 The EU Commission (2004c) con¯rms the latter ¯ndings by showing
that the "dispersion of sovereign bond yields between countries has decreased
substantially (...), [but] there are still some barriers to overcome before full inte-
gration is reached."64 Baele et al. (2004) incorporate yet another perspective and
¯nd that, since the euro's introduction, integration in the "government bond mar-
ket has been very high (...) [and] yields became increasingly driven by common
news, and less by purely local risk factors. However, (...) additional integration
of the government bond market may be possible."65 Thus, somewhat unsurpris-
ingly, Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003) point to the potential existence of "multiple
equilibria"66 in the government bond market.67
With respect to the corporate bond market, the analysis of Baele et al. (2004)
"suggests that the level and evolution of corporate bond yield spreads in the
euro area is to a large extent determined by credit rating, and to a lesser extent
56European Banking Federation (2003), p. 3.
57Trichet (2003), p. 1. See also ECB (2002b) and the regular ECB publications on the euro area money
market, such as ECB (2004c), ECB (2003b), ECB (2002a).
58ECB (2003a), p. 64.
59Hartmann et al. (2003), p. 196.
60Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001), p. 5.
61European Banking Federation (2003), p. 4.
62Adam et al. (2002), p. 3.
63Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p. 53f.
64EU Commission (2004c), p. 23.
65Baele et al. (2004), p. 44.
66Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p. 17.
67For example, the remaining divergence arises from di®erences in liquidity, credit risk, issuance practices,
trading platforms, economic fundamentals and the absence of a single bond yield curve. The heated debates
on the future of the Stability and Growth Pact might also play a role. See Baele et al. (2004), p. 37®., EU
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by the common, coupon, maturity, liquidity and sector factors. (...) Corporate
bond markets (...) are reasonably integrated with each other."68 Their results are
con¯rmed by the EU Commission (2004c), which demonstrates that an "analysis
of ECB data on corporate bond yields reveals country premia are low,"69 and by
the ECB (2003a), which argues that the "markets for high-yield debt securities
and asset-backed securities (...) remain fragmented. (...) Another example of an
imperfectly integrated market is the short-term securities market."70
The picture with respect to the degree of ¯nancial integration is less clear in
the equity market. The work of Baele et al. (2004) indicates that the degree of
¯nancial integration is on the rise: "Equity returns in euro area countries have
become increasingly more correlated (...), increasingly determined by common
news factors and less by country-speci¯c factors, (...) [and the] home bias (...)
has decreased considerably."71 Adam et al. (2002) similarly point out that their
"indicators of European stock market integration generally suggest an increasing
degree of stock market integration for the Euro area."72 Adjaout¶ e and Danthine
(2003) add to these results by providing evidence of a lower cost of equity for
European ¯rms in an integrated euro area, and of a paradigm shift in asset
allocation: from a country-based to a sector-based approach.73 The European
Banking Federation (2003) agrees and recognizes a "shift away from country-
based investments towards sector-based investments, (...) [and a] much greater
degree of correlation in equity price movements."74
The blurred picture with respect to the degree of integration in the equity
market is underscored by the European Banking Federation (2003), which sug-
gests that equity markets remain "essentially domestic in nature and greatly
underdeveloped."75 Emiris (2002) is skeptical, as well, and concludes that his
"empirical application has shown that European equity markets are not perfectly
integrated."76 Hartmann et al. (2003) are only able to provide "weak evidence
that some integration in equity markets took place over the past few years,"77
and, similarly, Ayuso and Blanco (2000) argue that their results rather provide
"mild support to the existence of an increase in stock market linkages."78 Baele
et al. (2004) even remark that "despite these advances in euro area equity market
integration, it remains among the least integrated of those we have examined."79
Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) point to a potential explanation of the rather slow
process in equity market integration by arguing that "the impact of the euro on
68Baele et al. (2004), p. 54.
69EU Commission (2004c), p. 23.
70ECB (2003a), p. 64.
71Baele et al. (2004), p. 81. See also EU Commission (2004c), p. 21f., ECB (2003a), p. 63.
72Adam et al. (2002), p. 50.
73See Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p. 53f. "Taking account of average returns, and not only of correlations,
(...) clearly strengthens the rationale for the paradigm change." (Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p. 53)
74European Banking Federation (2003), p. 6f.
75European Banking Federation (2003), p. 6f.
76Emiris (2002), p. 219.
77Hartmann et al. (2003), p. 199.
78Ayuso and Blanco (2000), p. 182.
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European equity markets has been felt mostly on the economic factors that drive
share prices and less on the structure of the trading of the same securities."80
Although it is possible for investors to trade almost all ¯nancial instruments, it
is well-documented that the costs of cross-border trades are still substantially
higher than the costs of domestic trades.81
A consensus has emerged that the degree of integration in EU retail ¯nancial
markets is rather low overall. The EU Commission (2004c) acknowledges that
"some lending activity within the EU remains fragmented when considering the
retail end of the spectrum."82 Adam et al. (2002) provide evidence that "credit
market integration (...) has so far been modest and is still far from being com-
plete,"83 SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) conclude that "retail ¯nancial markets
still reveal substantial fragmentation,"84 and Cabral, Dierick, and Vesala (2002)
claim that "market segmentation remains strongest in the retail area."85
A closer look at the credit market reveals important nuances in the overall low
degree of integration in this ¯nancial market segment. In their comprehensive
study, Baele et al. (2004) ¯nd di®erences in corporate lending "between short-
term and medium- / long-term lending, with the former being more segmented
(...), mortgage loan rates seem to be more uniform across countries than they were
in the past, while the consumer credit segment remains relatively fragmented (...),
[and] clear signs of persistent home biases."86 These observations are re°ected by
the EU Commission (2002), which observes that the "market for consumer credit
is still segmented. (...) [The] mortgage market is also still segmented. (...) There
are some signs of a more uni¯ed market for corporate loans."87 Kleimeier and
Sander (2002) express the low degrees of ¯nancial integration in EU retail markets
in an even more direct manner by asking "Do we then ¯nd evidence for a uniform
European retail banking market? The brief answers are: No for mortgages, maybe
no for consumer lending, and maybe yes for corporate lending."88
There seems to be no consensus on the outlook for the future degree of in-
tegration in retail banking. Kleimeier and Sander (2002) point out that their
results "suggest that the introduction of the single currency already had and will
most likely continue to have an important impact on the emergence of a single
Eurozone retail banking market."89 Padoa-Schioppa (2000) is less optimistic and
argues that "in the case of retail activities (...), cross-border operations are largely
lacking, but we should not expect the signs thereof to materialize very soon."90
80Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001), p. 16.
81See Giovannini Group (2001), Giovannini Group (2003), Serifsoy and Weiss (2003), and Tapking and Yang
(2004). "In spite of the many consolidation e®orts, there are still 20 or so national delivery-versus-payment
systems in the European Union today. (...) This is not normal." (Trichet (2003), p. 1)
82EU Commission (2004c), p. 15. In a prior study, the Commission argued that "in the area of retail banking,
(...) a large degree of fragmentation (...) remains." (EU Commission (2002), p. 17)
83Adam et al. (2002), p. 3.
84SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 56.
85Cabral, Dierick, and Vesala (2002), p. 47.
86Baele et al. (2004), p. 66.
87EU Commission (2002), p. 18.
88Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 19.
89Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 37.
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The European Banking Federation (2003) claims bluntly that "retail banking
markets remain segmented and banks cannot market a single product on an EU-
wide basis,"91 whereas SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) more calmly suggest that
"considering the underlying obstacles to integration, (...) national retail ¯nancial
markets will remain segmented to a certain degree."92 "Responsible for this low
degree of integration in retail markets are a number of natural barriers, such as
language or culture, as well as politically induced market access barriers such as
regulations or taxation."93
This overview of recent ¯nancial integration studies has shown that the con-
cept of ¯nancial integration is discussed, and the degree of ¯nancial integration is
measured from diverse angles in the literature. Figure 1 provides an indication of
the degrees of integration in EU ¯nancial markets. The observation from Manna
(2004), which was already quoted in the introduction, that "(...) 'integrated
wholesale markets, fragmented retail markets' is how most mainstream analyses
would probably summarize the state of the euro area banking business"94 seems
justi¯ed overall. Our research draws on and complements the plurality in ap-
proaches, indicators and results, beginning with our derivation of a de¯nition of
¯nancial integration, which will come next.
Financial market segment Selected sub-segments Degree of FMI
Wholesale markets:
Money market Unsecured
Secured
Derivatives Interest rate swaps
Gov. bond futures
Bond market Gov. bonds
Corporate bonds
Equity market Equity
Retail markets:
Credit market Corporate loans
Mortgage loans
ST letter of credit
Consumer loans
?
6
+
high
low
-
Source: Own illustration. FMI = ¯nancial market integration, Gov. government, ST = short-term.
Figure 1: Indication of the degree of integration in EU ¯nancial markets
91European Banking Federation (2003), p. 10.
92SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 57.
93Eppendorfer et al. (2002), p. 1.
94Manna (2004), p. 7.3 METHODOLOGY 14
3 Methodology
3.1 De¯nition of ¯nancial integration: 'Maximum similarity'
Numerous de¯nitions of ¯nancial integration are available in the rich literature.
These de¯nitions focus on di®erent, yet related aspects of ¯nancial integration, as
Table 3 re°ects. This plurality is needed since a de¯nition of ¯nancial integration
must take into account the characteristics of the speci¯c market segment for
which progress in ¯nancial integration is being analyzed, and the methodology
applied. For example, Emiris (2002) focuses on the equity market and declares
that "¯nancial integration is then de¯ned as a process whereby stock markets
become increasingly a®ected by the common, EU-wide risk factors, while the
in°uence of country-speci¯c risks is gradually reduced."95
Focus Research study De¯nition of ¯nancial integration
Law of one
price
(theoretical
perspective)
EU Commission
(2004c)
"(...) perfectly integrated market is a market where the Law of
One Price (...) holds and where supply and demand can react
immediately to cross-border price di®erentials. (...) extent to
which similar ¯nancial instruments (same risk / return pro¯le)
are traded at the same price." (p. 1)
Adjaout¶ e and
Danthine (2003)
"Full ¯nancial integration implies that the law of one price
applies to ¯nancial assets available across the euro-area. This
means that the same discount factor is used to value uncertain
but identical future cash °ows (...)." (p. 8)
Cabral, Dierick,
and Vesala
(2002)
"The concept of integration refers to a situation in which, out
of previously segmented markets for a single product (or sub-
stitute products), one coherent market is created. Markets are
considered integrated when the law-of-one-price holds, i.e. the
prices for the products in question are the same irrespective
of the geographical domicile of the seller or the buyer of the
product." (p. 7)
Barriers to
trade and
investment
(stakeholder
perspective)
Hartmann et al.
(2003),
similarly ECB
(2003a), p. 53
"Financial integration is di®erent from ¯nancial structure in
that it refers to the ease with which ¯nancial instruments can
be traded across regions, across national borders, or even glob-
ally. Formally, one can say that an economic area is ¯nancially
integrated if there are no barriers that discriminate agents in
their access to and investment of funds within that area, on
the basis of their location." (p. 189)
SchÄ uler and
Heinemann
(2002)
"Perfect ¯nancial integration is given if national borders do
not play any role for cross-border ¯nancial transactions."
(p. 35)
Broad
perspective
Baele et al.
(2004)
"The market for a given set of ¯nancial instruments and/or
services is fully integrated if all potential market participants
with the same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of
rules when they decide to deal with those ¯nancial instruments
and/or services; (2) have equal access to the above-mentioned
set of ¯nancial instruments and/or services; (3) are treated
equally when they are active in the market." (p. 6)
Source: Own illustration, own compilation.
Table 3: Classi¯cation of selected ¯nancial integration de¯nitions
95Emiris (2002), p. 218.3 METHODOLOGY 15
The classi¯cation of Table 3 demonstrates that a single de¯nition of ¯nancial
integration seems too rigid. There exist both broad and narrow de¯nitions of
¯nancial integration, and research studies either analyze an individual ¯nancial
market segment or investigate many segments, as we have discussed in the pre-
vious section. Since de¯nitions of ¯nancial integration usually correspond to the
research framework used, we also need to develop a de¯nition of ¯nancial integra-
tion. Our de¯nition is broad in scope, encompasses many segments and is based
on those provided in Table 3. Yet, it innovates with respect to two dimensions:
First, our de¯nition of ¯nancial integration, displayed in Table 4, incorporates
the concept of similarities, or distances. Second, it lifts the de¯nition of ¯nancial
integration to the aggregate level of individual EU member states.
- The concept of ¯nancial market integration refers to the creation of a
single EU-wide ¯nancial market that results from an increase in
similarities of previously segmented national markets.
- An increase in similarities, or a decrease in distances, is characteristic
for a ¯nancial integration process.
- For a uni¯cation process between two or more ¯nancial markets to
happen, it is important to remove di®erences between them.
- In fully integrated ¯nancial markets, distances will be minimized and
maximum similarity will be achieved.
Source: Own illustration.
Table 4: De¯nition of EU ¯nancial integration of Kiehlborn and Mietzner
It is important to distinguish our de¯nition of ¯nancial integration from some
of the common de¯nitions of economic integration. According to economic trade
theories, trade integration and / or free trade will lead, among other things, to
a specialization of countries, and to an international division of labor. In other
words, similarities between countries are expected to decrease if economic inte-
gration progresses. This might hold, as well, in the case of ¯nancial integration,
which we regard as a special variant of economic integration. One example is
given by those areas in which consumer preferences, or the ways in which goods
are supplied, remain di®erent among the member countries of a ¯nancially in-
tegrating zone, regardless of the overall progress in ¯nancial integration. We
acknowledge that it is in some cases bene¯cial for market participants, and for
countries, to become more dissimilar, i.e. more specialized, in times of rising
degrees of ¯nancial integration.
There are a number of reasons why our de¯nition of ¯nancial integration seems
appropriate, and this is important to stress, in our research setting. The above3 METHODOLOGY 16
review of the rich micro-level literature on EU ¯nancial integration has demon-
strated that an increase in the degree of ¯nancial integration has translated,
although to di®ering degrees, into an increase in similarities, or into a decrease
of distances, of national ¯nancial market segments - regardless of the employed
methodologies, and regardless of the employed indicators. To repeat but a few
examples from the above discussion, recent research has shown that the corre-
lation of national equity market returns has increased, that the characteristics
of capital market products have become considerably more similar, and that the
standard deviations, or other measures of dispersion, of bond yields have greatly
decreased.
The concept of 'minimum distances', or 'maximum similarity', innovates, yet
it is implicitly in line with previous ¯ndings. There seems to have emerged a
consensus that, as SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) point out, an investigation of
"the extreme cases of perfect integration and no integration are only of theoretical
interest."96 This view is also taken by the ECB (2003a), which speaks of an
"optimal level of integration (...)."97 Kleimeier and Sander (2002), who focus on
retail credit markets, argue, as well, that "full equalization cannot be expected,
the concept of market integration requires that interest rates should exhibit a
certain long-run equilibrium relationship."98
Our adopted macro-level de¯nition of ¯nancial integration acknowledges that
¯nancial integration is an ongoing process. It also re°ects our research objectives,
namely the identi¯cation of groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries,
and the assessment of the status quo, progress and trends of EU ¯nancial integra-
tion. As we have outlined in our introductory comments, we hypothesize that the
barriers to ¯nancial integration - regulatory, legal, geographical, tax-related, cul-
tural and historic - will be visible in group building, if it exists. Strong 'mobility
barriers' in fragmented EU ¯nancial markets should have created stable sets of
¯nancially more closely integrated countries. The well-documented reduction and
removal of these barriers over time within the EU should have led to a reduction
of the di®erences between a) these groups, and between b) individual countries.
In turn, this increase in similarities, i.e. this ¯nancial integration process, should
have translated into a change of the groups' composition, and into a change of
the groups' number. With increasing degrees of ¯nancial integration, countries
should leave their traditional group, join other groups, or form new groups. To
reach our research objectives, we require indicators. This will be discussed next.
96SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 35.
97ECB (2003a), p. 54. An "optimal level of integration is achieved when further consolidation or concentration
of markets would mean that the bene¯ts of integration are outweighed by the loss of opportunities (...) or that
markets are no longer contestable."
98Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 10.3 METHODOLOGY 17
3.2 Choice of sample indicators, period and countries
This paper quanti¯es distances and similarities between ¯nancial markets in-
directly by combining sets of ¯nancial integration indicators. Our macro-level
approach re°ects that 'the' EU ¯nancial market is often separated into the above
discussed segments wholesale / retail markets or, more narrowly, money, deriva-
tives, bond, equity and credit markets to derive judgments about the evolution
of ¯nancial integration. Our identi¯cation of groups of ¯nancially more closely
integrated countries aims to incorporate as many variables of as many ¯nancial
market segments as possible in order to put the research on a broad footing.
Following the recommendations of Adam et al. (2002), our choice of variables is
based on the criteria "data availability, data reliability, and economic content."99
Although cluster analysis, as we will further outline in the next section, is an
appropriate methodology for identifying groups of ¯nancially more closely inte-
grated countries, data availability and data reliability are major obstacles. First,
in order to avoid distortions and noise in our results, a precondition for data to be
included is that it is simultaneously available for all investigated countries and for
all investigated time periods. Unfortunately, the availability of such data poses
serious challenges. The EU Commission (2004c) points out that this problem
is faced by many researchers who measure progress in EU ¯nancial integration
quantitatively: "Price indicators are not always available because the underlying
data series are lacking or incomplete."100 Even if complete data series are avail-
able, the time period of their availability is often limited. In light of these severe
data and time period constraints, our analysis needs to be restricted to the period
1995 to 2002 and cannot be conducted for a broad set of indicators.
The pool of indicators than can be used as an input for our research is narrowed
by a second obstacle. Of the few data series available for our investigated time
period, most are not su±ciently harmonized from a statistical point of view.101
Yet, harmonization is especially needed for price-based indicators to serve as
appropriate integration indicators. Relatively homogenous assets are available
for the money and the government bond markets, whereas this is "not necessarily
the case for credit market rates, as there may be very signi¯cant di®erences with
respect to credit risk."102 These limitations have only recently been addressed by
public and private research institutions, which is unfortunately too late for our
backward-looking analysis.103
We base our research on price-based indicators that best ful¯ll the above out-
lined requirements. As was discussed above, price-based indicators have various
advantages in comparison with quantity-based indicators, and they are often em-
ployed in ¯nancial integration studies. One major bene¯t, compared to quantity-
based indicators is that the impact of new integration measures become visible
99Adam et al. (2002), p. 4.
100EU Commission (2004c), p. 2.
101See Baele et al. (2004), p. 14, Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 17f.
102Baele et al. (2004), p. 14.
103For example, the ECB has started to publish harmonized interest rates for the euro area in 2003.3 METHODOLOGY 18
more quickly in price-based indicators.104 In addition, price-based indicators are
closely related to the law of one price, and, despite the above discussed limitations
of this law, "checking the validity of the law of one price remains the natural basis
for (...) measures of ¯nancial integration."105 We agree with Baele et al. (2004)
that the results for the pre-1999 period are in°uenced by exchange rate consid-
erations,106 yet do not regard this as a problem, since our analysis is concerned
with assessing the degree and evolution of ¯nancial integration: Exchange rate
convergence in the pre-1999 period and the subsequent elimination of exchange
rate risk in 1999 is part of this process.
The choice of indicators follows the recommendations of the EU Commission
(2003).107 Our indicators represent the euro area money, credit and government
bond markets. The results are partly derived from the ECB national interest rates
series,108 which were also employed by Baele et al. (2004), SchÄ uler and Heinemann
(2002), and Kleimeier and Sander (2002).109 Since not all data series are available
for all countries and for all periods, we restrict the analysis to three retail lending
markets and to one retail deposit market: (1) Mortgage loans to households (N2
series), (2) consumer loans to households (N3 series), (3) short-term loans to
enterprises (N4 series), and (4) time deposits (N8 series). In addition, we use
monthly data, provided by Deutsche Bank (DB) Research, for (5) the 3-months
money market rate (M3IR), and (6) the 10-year government bond rate (Y10IR).
We follow the reasoning of Baele et al. (2004) and SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002)
in our holistic research setting and use nominal interest rates.110 We agree, in
particular, that "(...) consumers and ¯rms look at nominal rates when borrowing
or investing money. In°ation in the foreign country, and thus, real interest rates
do not matter to them."111
These price-based indicators are an obvious starting point for our analysis. We
have run a separate analysis that incorporates various e±ciency and quantity-
based indicators in addition to our selected price-based indicators in order to
a) put the research on a broader footing, and b) control for the robustness of
our results. However, the available data series for the e±ciency and quantity-
based indicators are in most cases, as we have already pointed out above, either
incomplete or their cross-border comparability appears questionable. We have
applied data augmentation algorithms to ¯ll in the missing data points to solve
the former problem. Yet, this approach violates the above outlined data quality
requirements, and puts noise to the analysis. The same holds true with respect to
attempts to improve the cross-border comparability of the additional indicators,
and to adjusting the rates for risk. Risk adjustment in the case of government
104For example, it takes a relatively long time period to change the composition of equity portfolios.
105Baele et al. (2004), p. 7.
106See Baele et al. (2004), p. 12.
107See EU Commission (2003), p. 22.
108See ECB (2004b), ECB (2002c). "These are the only available interest rate series that go back to the
beginning of the nineties for the time being." (Baele et al. (2004), p. 58)
109See Baele et al. (2004), p. 57®., SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 42®., Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 39®.
110See Baele et al. (2004), p. 13, SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 42.
111SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 42.3 METHODOLOGY 19
bond rates is obvious, as one could apply country credit ratings to eliminate
country risk. However, in the case of credit rates, it is not straightforward.
For these reasons, we restrict the analysis to the outlined 'clean' price-based
indicators: The data series of these indicators are complete, the indicators have
been employed in previous studies, and they are to our knowledge the most
reliable ones available. We use data from the ECB and DB Research, since
we assume that this data has been carefully put together so as to make the
underlying assets as comparable across countries as possible.112 Thus, we have
reason to believe that it is not distortions in data that drive our results. In the
interpretation of our results, it still has to be taken into account that the reduced
database from which we are able to derive judgments, and the fact that these
interest rates are not risk-adjusted limits the representativeness of the clustering
procedure.
The analysis focuses on euro area countries, yet excludes Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands for data limitations. Our study comprises the
eight euro area countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, and is conducted for the period 1995 to 2002. Table 5
provides an overview of the sample indicators, period and countries.
Indicators: A) Money market: (1) 3-months money market rate
(M3IR)
B) Credit market: (2) Mortgage loans to households
(N2 series)
(3) Consumer loans to households
(N3 series)
(4) Short-term loans to enterprises
(N4 series)
(5) Time deposits
(N8 series)
C) Bond market: (6) 10-year government bond rate
(Y10IR)
Time period: 1995 to 2002
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Source: Own illustration.
Table 5: Overview of sample indicators, period and countries
112See Baele et al. (2004), p. 14.3 METHODOLOGY 20
3.3 Indicators employed: Stylized facts
This section provides insights for the expected increases in similarities between
the investigated countries, and complements the above review of the literature, by
discussing the indicators employed from the following perspectives. In a ¯rst step,
we analyze whether a convergence in absolute interest rate terms has occurred.
To this end, we calculate the annual average of each indicator for each year and
each country. In a second step, we analyze the extent to which the ¯nancial
market sub-segments represented by each indicator are integrated. Integration
can be measured by calculating the cross-sectional dispersions in interest rates
across countries. We follow both the EU Commission (2004a) and Baele et al.
(2004) and express the cross-sectional dispersions as a) the standard deviation,
and b) the coe±cient of variation.113 Both measures yield the same conclusions
overall, i.e. a convergence towards zero signals integration, a value of zero indicates
full integration. However, the standard deviation is expressed in %-terms and
might be in°uenced by the absolute mean value of the interest rates considered.
This potential distortion is eliminated by calculating relative statistics such as
the coe±cient of variation. The latter is standardized, since it is obtained by
dividing the standard deviation of rates by the corresponding series' mean value.
In addition, we calculate the year-to-year percentage changes of the standard
deviations and coe±cients of variation.
Although they do not allow us to distinguish between countries, cross-sectional
dispersions are particularly useful in our research context. First, an increase in
¯nancial integration, or an increase in similarities, should go hand in hand with
a reduction in price di®erentials. In other words, an increase in similarities is
equal to a reduction of the cross-sectional variance of the investigated time series,
or its square root 'standard deviation'. Second, a key advantage of calculating
cross-sectional dispersions is that "correlations and cross-sectional dispersions are
inversely correlated."114 The instantaneous cross-sectional dispersion tends to be
low in those cases in which series are strongly correlated, which they should be in
integrated ¯nancial markets. Third, correlations between annual data points for
a short time period, such as in our case, have a rather dubious economic content,
whereas the cross-sectional dispersion can be meaningfully calculated at any point
in time.115 Fourth, the calculation of the percentage by which the cross-sectional
dispersion statistics have changed year-to-year provides an indication of the speed
of ¯nancial integration.116
113See EU Commission (2004a), p. 5, Baele et al. (2004), p. 15, EU Commission (2003), p. 24f., Adam et al.
(2002), p. 15, Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p 196. Baele et al. (2004) calculate the cross-sectional dispersion
as standard deviations, EU Commission (2004a) uses coe±cients of variation, Adam et al. (2002) calculate the
standard deviation of the log values.
114Baele et al. (2004), p. 15.
115See Baele et al. (2004), p. 15.
116Adam et al. (2002) propose to use ¼-convergence to measure the speed of convergence. They apply it to the
investigated interest rates in terms of deviations from the German benchmark. See Adam et al. (2002), p. 21®.
Baele et al. (2004) also use the German bank interest rates as a benchmark. See Baele et al. (2004), p. 38®.,
p. 59. Our cluster analysis aims at identifying groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries. There
is no reason in this research framework why Germany, or any other country, should be taken as a benchmark.3 METHODOLOGY 21
Figures 10 to 12, provided in the appendix, plot the development of the indi-
cators in terms of aggregate levels and cross-sectional dispersions.117 The cross-
sectional standard deviation was for all rates on the order of several hundred basis
points in 1995, implying a relatively strong degree of fragmentation. A conver-
gence of rates has taken place in all investigated market segments from 1995 to
2002, yet to varying degrees. Convergence was strongest in the unsecured money
market, represented by the M3IR indicator. In this segment, convergence was
rapid in the pre-EMU period, and it was particularly pronounced for the south-
ern euro area countries Italy, Portugal and Spain. This market segment became
fully integrated with the introduction of the euro and EURIBOR118 in 1999.
A similar pattern is observable for the government bond market, as the sta-
tistics and graphs for the Y10IR rate indicate. Again, most of the convergence
has occurred in the run-up to the start of EMU, with the yields in Finland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain showing an almost dramatic decrease. Yet, the developments
of the absolute values of the two cross-sectional dispersion statistics, and in par-
ticular their year-to-year percentage changes, illustrate that a slight divergence
in government bond yields is observable between 1999 and 2001. The remaining
dispersion in the Y10IR rate has recently been relatively stable, which provides
evidence that integration in the euro area government bond market is not perfect.
Stable barriers to full integration remain and need to be overcome.119
Financial integration in each of the investigated credit market segments has
taken place, as well, but the degree of integration is lower. All rates tended to
converge, but the speed and intensity of convergence in the credit market segments
are below those observed in the money and government bond markets. The
analysis of the two cross-sectional dispersion statistics reveals that there exists
no straightforward integration pattern in the mortgage, consumer, and corporate
loan markets nor in the time deposit market. In the mortgage loan to households
market, progress in ¯nancial integration was most pronounced, since rates have
converged relatively strongly and both cross-sectional dispersion statistics have
steadily decreased. Yet, the ¯nancial integration process in the mortgage loan
market has slowed down in recent years, and rates have even weakly drifted apart
in 2001 and 2002.
The evidence with respect to the time deposit market points to a comparably
advanced, yet incomplete degree of ¯nancial integration in this market segment.
The integration process was fastest in the pre-EMU period. Yet, in contrast to
the mortgage market, the degree of ¯nancial integration has continued to increase
in the post-EMU era, and the cross-sectional dispersion statistics are now almost
Baele et al. (2004) suggest to perform a regression of the cross-sectional dispersion on a time trend. See Baele
et al. (2004), p. 15. We use annual data, i.e. the average of a twelve-months period, for a short time period,
which is why a regression on a time trend is not warranted. SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002) use interest rate
spreads. See SchÄ uler and Heinemann (2002), p. 42®.
117The underlying data tables, the graphs of the development of the indicators employed at the country level
as well as the year-to-year percentage changes are available upon request.
118EURIBOR = Euro Interbank O®ered Rate.
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at the low level of the government bond market. The rates of Finland, France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain have experienced the strongest convergence over the
investigated time period.
Both the consumer and the enterprise loan markets show rather erratic pat-
terns, and progress in ¯nancial integration is less evident. In both markets,
convergence of rates is visible in absolute terms, but less than in the above dis-
cussed ¯nancial market segments. The standard deviations and coe±cients of
variation are high and integration has taken place only weakly in the time period
1995 to 1998. The ¯nancial integration process in these two market segments
seems to have followed an, in our view, unexpected development after the intro-
duction of the euro: In 2002, a) the two corresponding standard deviations have
returned close to their 1997 levels, and b) the two corresponding coe±cients of
variation are even above their 1995 level. However, in these two market segments,
remarkable patterns can be detected in the development of the German, Italian,
Portuguese, and Spanish rates. Since 1998, the German rates have been higher
than the rates of all other countries. The rates of the latter three countries have
strongly converged with the rates of the rest of the investigated countries before
the start of EMU. The Italian rates have even declined so much that they have
been among the lowest since 1999.
In sum, the analysis of the interest rate series has applied various indicators
of ¯nancial integration. Most of the investigated interest rates have tended to
converge in absolute levels between 1995 and 2002, with most of the convergence
happening in the run-up to the start of EMU. Yet, ¯nancial integration, as mea-
sured by the cross-sectional dispersion of rates is progressing at varying degrees
and varying speeds across di®erent ¯nancial market segments. In fact, there are
even increases in the cross-sectional dispersion statistics observable for some rates
in the years following the start of EMU, which suggests that ¯nancial integration
is not one-way. In addition, no interest rate has lain consistently above or be-
low another country's one. Overall, with the exception of the unsecured money
market segment, full integration has not occurred for any of the ¯nancial market
segments under investigation: The government bond market is highly integrated,
the mortgage and time deposit markets have experienced some integration, but
to a lesser extent, and the consumer and enterprise market segments still show
signs of fragmentation.
These results con¯rm the above discussed ¯ndings of the literature and suggest,
as well, that a combination of our indicators via cluster analysis can be expected
to detect interesting patterns re the grouping of countries. An increase in ¯nancial
integration should translate into an increase in similarities between countries, and,
in more technical terms, should result in a reduction of our proposed distances
measure. Before this combination will be performed, the next section will discuss
the merits of a cluster-based approach for achieving our research objectives.3 METHODOLOGY 23
3.4 Concept and advantages of cluster analysis
There is a strong case for using cluster analysis to identify groups of ¯nancially
more closely integrated countries. According to our de¯nition, a ¯nancial integra-
tion process corresponds to an increase in similarities, or a decrease in distances.
Cluster analysis performs a grouping of variables explicitly "on the basis of sim-
ilarities or distances."120 In addition, we aim at identifying homogenous groups
of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries. Cluster analysis is designed to
identify groups within an underlying population, maximizes homogeneity within
groups and heterogeneity between those groups, and does not assume ¯nancial
market segments to be independent from each other. Cluster analysis also allows
for a °exible, simultaneous analysis of multiple market segments and multiple
indicators. It does not depend on rigid assumptions, and "no assumptions are
made concerning the number of groups or the group structure."121 Normality as-
sumptions and homoscedasticity are of minor relevance. Finally, cluster analysis
copes with the limited data availability, since it only requires annual data.122
The algorithm underlying this paper is programmed in SAS and uses the Ward
algorithm.123 The Ward algorithm is particularly suited for our research setting
since this algorithm aims at minimizing the loss of information, or the loss of
homogeneity, that occurs by merging clusters.124 Initially, the number of groups
equals the number of countries in the sample with each individual country forming
one group. In a next step, the Ward algorithm combines those two countries which
are most similar to each other. At the end, after a series of successive mergers and
a loss in homogeneity, all groups are fused and all countries belong to one single
group. Although our data set only contains metric variables, i.e. all indicators are
interest rates that are expressed in percentage terms, a standardization needs to
be performed to treat all indicators equally in determining group composition.125
All values are standardized with mean ¹=0 and standard deviation ¾=1.
A year-to-year comparison of the y-values in the two-dimensional, tree-like
dendrogram allows for a dynamic analysis of a ¯nancial integration process. The
dendrogram displays the results of the clustering procedure for each year. In
other words, it is a graphical illustration of the mergers that were made at suc-
cessive levels of the clustering process. The x-axis displays the names of the
entities observed, namely the investigated euro area countries, the y-axis serves
as a distance measure: The y-axis displays the standardized similarity coe±-
120Johnson and Wichern (1998), p. 726.
121Johnson and Wichern (1998), p. 726.
122In the absence of this feature, for example, we would have had to exclude France, for which N2 and N3 are
only available quarterly.
123The programming code is available upon request. See Johnson and Wichern (1998) for the following.
124See Johnson and Wichern (1998), p. 739®., for an overview of linkage methods, i.e. single linkage (minimum
distance, nearest neighbor), complete linkage (maximum distance, farthest neighbor) and average linkage (av-
erage distance). See Johnson and Wichern (1998), p. 754®., for an overview of non-hierarchical procedures. A
drawback of the latter is that they require a prior speci¯cation of the number of clusters.
125Among other things, standardization is required to avoid a variable with a high variance dominating the
clustering procedure. It must also be performed if the underlying variables are of di®erent magnitude and are
not directly comparable. In our study, for example, this is the case for the money market rate and the consumer
loan rate, the latter always being higher.3 METHODOLOGY 24
cients, i.e. the semi-partial R-squared values, which result from the division of
the between-cluster sums of squares by the total variance of variables.126 Each
branch in the dendrogram tree represents a cluster, and the branches merge at
nodes. The position of the nodes on the y-axis indicates at which distance level
the mergers occur. If mergers take place at lower y-axis coe±cients in each sub-
sequent year in the investigated time period 1995 to 2002, then countries will
have become more similar, or ¯nancially more integrated, with respect to the
investigated variables. The intensity and speed of this integration process can
be measured by comparing the percentage changes in the reduction of the y-axis
values.
The identi¯cation of the 'correct' number of country groups requires judgment.
Cluster analysis does not prescribe any number of groups since no information
about the true belonging of a country to group is available, nor is it required.
One cannot distinguish 'true' from 'false' classi¯cations, only 'useful' or 'good'
ones from 'not so useful' or 'bad' ones.127 A useful approach to determining an
appropriate number of groups is to examine the changes in the fusion curve dur-
ing the clustering process. The fusion curve displays on the x-axis the number of
clusters, and on the y-axis the corresponding semi-partial R-squared values. The
fusion curve steadily increases as clusters, i.e. countries in our study, are com-
bined. The appropriate number of clusters, or country groups, to be considered
is the one that the x-axis indicates just before a sudden upward jump occurs in
this curve, re°ecting a relatively high loss in homogeneity.
Variances, means, F- and t-values are employed to assess the characteristics
of the identi¯ed country groups and to identify those discriminatory variables
that drive group building. To this end, clusters are compared pair wise with each
other on the level of individual variables with the help of means and variances.
The F-values indicate whether the level of dispersion of a speci¯c variable within
one group is greater or smaller than in the underlying data sample.128 Since we
aim at identifying homogenous groups, our goal is to ¯nd groupings in which
a maximum of variables have F-values < 1. Finally, a positive (negative) sign
of the t-value indicates that a variable in one speci¯c group is over- (under-)
represented vis-µ a-vis the entire sample.129 The absolute degree that a t-value
deviates from 0 can be interpreted as the extent to which a variable is either
over- or under-represented.
126At the start of the clustering process, the value of this coe±cient is zero, and it increases with the merger of
clusters. The between-cluster sums of squares are easier to interpret when they are divided by the total sum of
squares, i.e. the total variance of variables, to give proportions of variance (squared semi-partial correlations).
127Cluster algorithms search for good, but not in any case the best groupings. See Johnson and Wichern
(1998), p. 726f., Fahrmeier, Hamerle, and Tutz (1996), p. 438.
128F-value =
¾2
i;k
¾2
i
. The variance ¾2
i;k of variable i within group k is divided by the variance ¾2
i of variable i
within the whole dataset. If F> 1 (F< 1), then the group variance of variable i is greater (smaller) than in the
underlying entire data sample. See Backhaus et al. (2000), p. 378.
129t =
xi;k¡xi
¾i . xi;k is the mean of variable i in the group k, xi is the mean of variable i in the sample, and
¾i is the accompanying sample standard deviation. If the di®erence in the ratio is positive (negative), then the
small (large) values of the variable within a speci¯c group have to overcompensate the large (small) values. The
division by the standard deviation is required for standardization, i.e. to make the t-values comparable. See
Backhaus et al. (2000), p. 379.3 METHODOLOGY 25
Besides using cluster analysis to identify groups of ¯nancially more closely in-
tegrated countries, the inter-temporal nature of our approach, i.e. to measure the
speed of ¯nancial integration, is, to our knowledge, an innovation. Of particular
advantage is the fact that cluster analysis is able, vis-µ a-vis those methods that are
time series-based, to separately analyze the degree of ¯nancial integration in each
year. It follows that it does not matter in our research setting whether a time
series is long or short, whereas it does in regression-based approaches. Another
comforting feature is that time series do not need to be examined for structural
breaks since each year is separately assessed. This is not a circumvention of a
problem that lies at the heart of other methodologies:130 Cluster analysis allows
one to accurately investigate the e®ects of structural breaks. For example, the
e®ects of the introduction of the euro, clearly promoting EU ¯nancial integration
and a structural break, should become visible in cluster analysis via a smaller
agglomeration coe±cient on the y-axis of the dendrogram.
The cluster-based approach, as it is used in this paper, has drawbacks that have
to be borne in mind in the interpretation of the clustering results. First, some
commonly applied econometric concepts, such as the calculation of signi¯cance
values via a test of equality of means, simply cannot be applied to small samples,
such as our eight-country study. Second, cluster analysis is a tool that leaves
room for interpretation, a drawback which we actually consider an advantage in
our research setting, as we have argued above. Third, it is important to note
that this method may be sensitive to the presence of outliers. Thus, the resulting
con¯guration of groupings must always be carefully examined.
In sum, there is a strong case for using cluster analysis to identify groups
of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries, and to derive indications of the
speed of ¯nancial integration.131 Countries that are assigned to the same group
are more similar and, thus, ¯nancially more closely integrated with each other
with respect to the underlying indicators than those countries that do not belong
to this group.
130For example, Baele et al. (2004) employ the same indicators that we use in our study. Yet, they distinguish
between 3 sub-periods, i.e. 1990-94, 1995-98, and 1999-onwards. See Baele et al. (2004), p. 58®. Adam et al.
(2002) measure convergence for these indicators for the two periods pre-EMU and post-EMU. See Adam et al.
(2002), p. 22f. Kleimeier and Sander (2002) ¯nd "evidence in favor of a structural break around the time of
the introduction of the single currency." (Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 16) Consequently, they divide their
sample into a pre-EMU period 1995-98 and a EMU period 1999-onwards. See Kleimeier and Sander (2002),
p. 9®.
131Discriminant analysis and logit-/probit models may be used to investigate the discriminatory power of
variables. Various restrictive assumptions do not hold in our research setting.4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 26
4 Evidence: Application of cluster analysis
4.1 General ¯ndings: Integration waves, similarity barriers
The groupings of the investigated countries are obtained from separately running
the Ward algorithm in SAS for each year of the time period 1995-2002. We then
calculated the fusion curves to determine the appropriate number of country
groups.132 As outlined in the previous section, we choose the number of groups
just before a sudden upward jump in the respective fusion curve occurs, re°ecting
a relatively high loss in homogeneity.
An aggregate view of results reveals interesting patterns with respect to the
speed and progress of euro area ¯nancial integration. Figure 2 displays on the left
hand scale the maximum fusion distances, their development over time is shown
by the solid line. The maximum fusion distance represents the distance measure
by which all investigated countries form one single group. This measure is zero in
a fully integrated market. A decline in this statistic towards zero indicates that
an integration process is taking place. The year-to-year percentage change of this
statistic provides an indication of the speed of ¯nancial integration.
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Figure 2: Maximum fusion distances and number of groups in each year
The development of the maximum fusion distance curve over time suggests
that ¯nancial integration does not take place smoothly in the euro area. Instead,
it may happen in waves. The high values of the maximum fusion distances at
which all countries form one single group in Period 1, i.e in 1995 and 1996,
underscore that a relatively strong degree of fragmentation prevailed among the
eight countries at the beginning of our examined time period. The observation
that there was not much change in the maximum fusion distances suggests that
¯nancial integration was initially taking place rather weakly.
132Figures 13 and 14 in the appendix display the fusion curves.4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 27
Both the speed and the intensity, by which ¯nancial integration has progressed,
increased remarkably in the period that predated the introduction of the euro in
1999 (Period 2). From 1996 to 1998, the maximum fusion distances decreased
from 0.78 to 0.36, which equals a reduction of -54%. The integration of the
short-term unsecured money market and the strong integration process in the
long-term government bond market, i.e. in the two investigated wholesale market
segments, account for most of this reduction. The observations for the period
1999-onwards (Period 3) suggest that ¯nancial integration has lost momentum
considerably with the start of EMU, since the distance measure has remained at
comparable levels since 1999. In fact, the results even point to an, admittedly
weak, disintegration process in the period 1999 to 2001. It takes until 2002 before
the distance measure falls back to, and even slightly below, the 1998 level.
These observations suggest that there may exist a level of ¯nancial integration
that one could characterize as 'maximum similarity' between countries. This ¯nd-
ing underscores the appropriateness of our ¯nancial integration de¯nition. More
importantly, it implies that extraordinary e®orts or events may be required to
push the degree of ¯nancial integration beyond 'maximum similarity barriers'.
In particular, the asymptotic development of the maximum fusion curve both
in the early and later years provides strong support for this notion. A barrier
seems to have existed in Period 1, with maximum fusion distance values °uctuat-
ing around 0.78. In Period 2, the certainty that EMU will start in 1999 seems to
have triggered an acceleration in the ¯nancial integration process, a sharp increase
in the degree of ¯nancial integration, and a lowering of the 'maximum similar-
ity barrier' towards values around 0.35. Despite all e®orts to promote ¯nancial
integration since 1999, the degree of ¯nancial integration has remained stable at
this lower distance measure in Period 3. Integration is far from being completed,
but, against the background of our ¯ndings, it remains to be seen whether the
FSAP measures, once they have been fully implemented in the euro area member
states, and once they have started to a®ect the day-to-day operations of market
participants, are su±cient to infuse new life into the recently weakly progressing
¯nancial integration process.
The right hand scale in Figure 2 displays the number of groups that the cal-
culated fusion curves have indicated as being the most appropriate ones for each
investigated year. Initially, from 1995 to 1997, a pre-EMU zone of two ¯nancial
integration levels can be identi¯ed. Two groups of ¯nancially more closely in-
tegrated countries coexisted in this period, and group composition was stable,
as the next section will show in more detail. The acceleration in the ¯nancial
integration process that took place in Period 2, and which we detected in the
above analysis of the maximum fusion distances, translated into a break-up of
this original divide. In fact, the introduction of the euro in 1999 seems to have
shaken up the number of groups entirely: The clustering procedure has identi¯ed
¯ve groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries in 1999. In light of4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 28
the fact that we only consider eight countries in this study, an explanation of
these ¯ndings could be that the year 1999 may have served as the beginning of
a 'transition phase' towards the creation of new sets of ¯nancially more closely
integrated countries. This view is supported by the observation that the number
of country groups has increased from two in the period 1995-1997 to four between
1999-2002, on average. Thus, we agree with Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003) that
"the euro together with the accompanying structural changes (...) has not been
the minor event that some had predicted."133
In sum, our results suggest that EU ¯nancial integration could take place in
waves, that substantial 'maximum similarity barriers' may need to be overcome
to boost EU ¯nancial integration in the future, and that there existed distinct
groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries in the past. EMU seems
to have played a strong role in changing the number and composition of groups
over time. The next section will provide detailed evidence on how remarkable
this change was.
4.2 Detailed evidence: Existing, but greatly changing groups
This section discusses the results of the clustering procedure for each year. The
dendrograms graphically illustrate the mergers of countries that were made at
successive levels of the agglomeration process. The x-axis displays the names
of the countries, the y-axis represents the fusion distance measure. The above
discussed F-value, i.e. the ratio of inner-group variance over total sample variance,
is for most variables and most groups below one.134 This implies a high degree
of homogeneity of countries belonging to one assigned group, signaling validity of
our clustering results.
Figure 3 displays the results of the clustering procedure for the year 1995. Ac-
cording to the fusion curve, displayed in Figure 13 in the appendix, two groups of
¯nancially more closely integrated countries should be chosen. The ¯rst partition
G1 contains Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Germany. The second group
G2 is made up of Italy, Portugal and Spain. G1 can be classi¯ed as a 'low interest
rate zone', and G2 as a 'high interest rate zone'. The t-values of G1 are without
exception below zero, which implies that the group mean of all interest rates is
below the corresponding sample mean. In contrast, all t-values lie above zero in
G2, implying that the group mean of all interest rates is higher than the corre-
sponding sample mean. In addition, the absolute deviation of the t-values from
zero is greater for G2 than for G1. This ¯nding indicates that the G2 countries
are further away from the sample mean than the countries that belong to G1.
In sum, the cluster procedure is able to identify two groups of ¯nancially more
closely integrated countries in 1995, with mean interest rates being substantially
higher among G2 countries than among G1 countries.
133Adjaout¶ e and Danthine (2003), p. 230. See also, among other studies, Geis, Mehl, and Wredenborg (2004),
ECB (2003c), ECB (2002d) on the international role of the euro.
134The descriptive statistics that characterize a group are provided in Tables 6 to 13 in the appendix.4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 29
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Figure 3: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 1995
Cluster Analysis: Ward Linkage 1996
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Figure 4: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 19964 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 30
Cluster Analysis: Ward Linkage 1997
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Figure 5: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 1997
Figure 4, in combination with the corresponding fusion curve, demonstrates
that this dichotomy between the degree of integration of euro area countries was
stable. Again, two groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries can
be identi¯ed in 1996. The composition and characteristics of these two country
groups are unchanged in comparison with the previous year. All t-values for G1
have remained below zero, all t-values for G2 are above zero, and the absolute
deviation of all group mean values from zero is greater for G2 than for G1.
A combination of the ¯ndings for 1995 with those for 1996 suggests that geo-
graphical proximity might have played a role in the divide of the euro area into
two groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries in this period. The
southern European countries Italy, Portugal and Spain have formed a stable 'Club
Med' group, as one could casually label G2. If one momentarily puts aside the
recommendations of the fusion curve and takes the analysis one level deeper, a
closer analysis of the composition of G1 indicates that country size may also have
played a role. In 1996, the three smaller-sized countries Austria, Belgium and
Finland have formed a sub-group, and the two largest EU economies France and
Germany another one.
The preparations for EMU have certainly started before 1997, yet the impact of
these preparations on the EU ¯nancial integration process only becomes slightly
visible in group building in 1997. As Figure 5 illustrates, the composition of
the Club Med group, which was stable until 1996, started to dissolve in this
year. Again, a two group solution is suggested by the fusion curve. Yet, in 1997,4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 31
Cluster Analysis: Ward Linkage 1998
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Figure 6: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 1998
Spain has switched into the low interest rate zone G1, whose composition has
remained unchanged otherwise. Although all Spanish rates remained higher, the
convergence of Spanish rates towards those of the other G1 countries was intense
enough to initiate this group change.
These ¯ndings for 1995 to 1997 overall suggest that the G1 countries may have
initially formed a 'core Europe' and the Club Med countries a 'non-core Europe',
or, in less controversial words, a 'core Europe 1' and 'core Europe 2'. In addition,
the previously detected slight role of geographic proximity and country size as
determinants for group building has diminished as the start of EMU came closer:
Taking the analysis further in the enlarged 1997 G1 group shows that Finland has
moved closer to Spain, France has become more similar to Austria and Belgium,
and Germany has been isolated from the other countries.
The beginning of the end of the divide of the euro area into two distinct groups
of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries, which the observations for 1997
hinted at, starts in 1998. The fusion curve recommends a three group solution
for 1998. Italy and Portugal still form a separate, high interest rate zone area
G2, but the formerly stable G1 group has started to dissolve. Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France and Spain now form a larger, second group of ¯nancially more
closely integrated countries. Germany has become more isolated and forms a
single group by itself. Germany has the lowest government bond and money
market rates, and its credit market seems to be out of step with the rest of the
investigated countries: On the one hand, the t-values for the German N2 and4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 32
Cluster Analysis: Ward Linkage 1999
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Figure 7: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 1999
N8 rates are negative, indicating a lower level of interest rates than the sample
average. This is the case for the new, large group as well, yet, the greater absolute
deviation from zero indicates that the German rates are lower than the average
of the large second group. On the other hand, the German N3 and N4 rates are
higher in comparison with the group formed by Italy and Portugal.
The above discussed view that the euro's introduction has brought an end
to the original divide of the EU into two groups, and that 1999 may have been
the beginning of a transition phase towards the establishment of new groups is
con¯rmed by the results for the period 1999-onwards. In 1999, the composition
of groups is shaken up. In this year, the fusion curve identi¯es ¯ve groups.
The 'Club Med' grouping has disappeared: Figure 7 shows that a) Portugal is
separated from Italy, b) Italy forms a group with Belgium, and c) Austria, Spain
and Portugal have teamed up. Finland, France and Germany each form a separate
group in 1999. In addition, the traditional classi¯cation of groups as 'high' and
'low' interest rate zones cannot be upheld: The t-values are positive for some
interest rates, and negative for others in each of the ¯ve groups.
The results for 2000 underscore the transition nature of the immediate post-
EMU era. The fusion curve points to a four-group solution. Belgium and Italy
remain in the same group, and France and Germany again form isolated groups.
Finland has left its isolation and joined Austria, Spain and Portugal. The analysis
of the t-values reveals remarkable patterns. Since the money market became
fully integrated with the adoption of EURIBOR, only the remaining indicators4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 33
Cluster Analysis: Ward Linkage 2000
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
S
e
m
i
-
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
AT PT FI ES BE IT FR DE
Name of observation or cluster
Source: Own illustration.
Figure 8: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 2000
contribute to group building. Although the original divide of Europe into a low
and a high interest zone was dismantled, as we just demonstrated, the evidence
points to the creation of a new set of countries that form not an 'always low',
but a 'mostly lower' interest rate zone. Austria, Finland, Portugal and Spain
might form this new group, since the t-values in this group are all negative, with
the exception of the government bond market. The t-values indicate, as well,
that France and Germany, which were members of a low interest rate zone at the
beginning of our investigated time period, now form two separate zones of 'higher'
interest rate levels, again with the exception of the government bond market.
The ¯ndings for 2001 and 2002 con¯rm this view. In 2001, the fusion curve
recommends the choice of three groups, in 2002, it recommends the choice of four
groups. In 2001, group composition almost fully re°ects the one of 2000.135 France
is the exception, since it is no longer isolated in 2001, instead forming one group
together with Belgium and Italy. Yet, if we deviate from the recommendations of
the fusion curve and take the cluster procedure one step back, then the four group
solution of the year 2000 results again: Both France and Germany are isolated,
and the other two groups are identical in their composition compared to 2000.
Finally, the four group solution is encountered in 2002 as well. These ¯ndings
suggest that new, stable groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries
may have been formed, marking the end of the transition phase that started with
the euro's introduction in 1999.
135The dendrogram for 2001 is available upon request.4 EVIDENCE: APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS 34
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Figure 9: Evidence of group building: Dendrogram for 2002
Strikingly, Germany and France seem to be isolated from the rest of the euro
zone, and from each other. This deserves special attention. First, our results
suggest that the EU ¯nancial integration process was quicker and more intense
for the smaller-sized as well as the southern European euro members. These
¯ndings con¯rm that "those EMU countries who have often been dubbed as
'non-core EMU' such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain may have been most
e®ected by integration e®orts (...) in the EMU period."136 In this light, our
results provide support to the heated debates on the inability of Germany and
France to undertake substantial structural reforms. Second, an isolation of these
two countries does not have to be negative. However, against the background of
their alleged position as 'engines' of EU integration, it could be argued that their
isolation from each other undermines their forerunner ability. Coming back to
Prodi's remarks, which were quoted above, our ¯ndings implicitly call on France
and Germany to step up their joint e®orts to retain their 'engine' position and
avoid becoming a 'wagon' in the union train.
Third, our results place doubt on the use of Germany as a benchmark in the
post-EMU era. Germany is the largest EMU member in economic terms, and
it has traditionally been a low-interest rate country overall. Convergence to a
German 'standard' seems intuitively right. The isolation of Germany since 1998
underscores that Germany indeed plays a special role in EU ¯nancial integration.
Yet, our observations put a question mark behind the rationale of treating Ger-
136Kleimeier and Sander (2002), p. 20f.5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 35
many as a benchmark case in the post-EMU period for all of the investigated
¯nancial market segments:137 Germany's rates are in some segments the lowest,
i.e. the government bond market, and in some credit markets among the highest.
In the latter case, if one believes that convergence will always take place to the
lowest available interest rate, other countries, or, as we have shown, even groups
of countries, should in the post-EMU era serve as benchmarks.
5 Conclusion and outlook
This paper has shed light on the EU ¯nancial integration process from a holistic,
macro-level perspective, and has introduced a powerful, yet intuitive method-
ological tool to the ¯nancial integration literature. The research has identi¯ed
groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries by combining price-based
indicators that meet strict quality requirements. We have applied cross-sectional
dispersion statistics, and an inter-temporal cluster analysis to assess if and how
¯nancial integration has evolved in the euro area. The inter-temporal nature of
the cluster analysis is, to our knowledge, an innovation.
Our research has provided evidence for the existence of distinct groups of
¯nancially more closely integrated countries. Initially, the euro area was divided
into two stable zones of di®ering ¯nancial integration levels. The southern states
Italy, Portugal and Spain had formed a high interest rate zone, and Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France and Germany a low interest rate zone. Geographic
proximity and country size may have played a role in group building before 1997.
This situation has changed remarkably. In the run-up period to the start of
EMU, in which ¯nancial integration was progressing rapidly, the original divide
started to dissolve. Countries began to leave their traditional group. Our ¯ndings
have suggested that the euro's introduction has shaken up the number and com-
position of groups, and that geographic proximity and country size have become
less relevant. Our results indicate that the start of EMU has initiated a transition
phase towards the creation of new groups of ¯nancially more closely integrated
countries. These ¯ndings convey an important political message: A dismantle-
ment of the formerly stable groups was possible among the 'old' euro countries,
which provides comfort to policymakers that the substantial di®erences between
the current and potentially new euro members can be overcome as well.138
Our results have put a question mark behind the rationale of using Germany
as a benchmark in the post-EMU period in all ¯nancial market segments, as
prior research has done. Our evidence has suggested that other countries, or
even groups of countries, serve in some market segments as better benchmarks.
In addition, we have demonstrated that France and Germany form special cases
in the euro zone overall. Initially, both were among the 'core' of a group of low
137Prior research pursuing this approach includes Adam et al. (2002) and Baele et al. (2004). See Adam et al.
(2002), p. 21®., and Baele et al. (2004), p. 38®., p. 59. See also FN 116.
138See the ECB's biannual convergence reports, e.g. ECB (2004a).5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 36
interest rate countries. Yet, Germany has become isolated since 1998, and France
since the beginning of EMU. This separation of France and Germany from each
other calls on these two countries to step up their joint e®orts to retain their
position as 'engines' in the EU's integration train. In addition, our results have
shown that the ¯nancial integration process was quicker and more intense for the
smaller-sized as well as for the southern European euro states. This observation
re°ects the sometimes criticized inability of France and Germany to undertake
substantial reforms.
Our research suggests that the EU ¯nancial integration process might take
place in waves. We have identi¯ed three periods of varying integration speeds and
intensities. The degree of EU ¯nancial integration remained stable in Period 1,
comprising 1995-96, with ¯nancial integration progressing weakly. The speed and
intensity of ¯nancial integration increased noticeably in the run-up to EMU in
Period 2, i.e. 1996-98. In more recent years, after the euro's introduction, ¯nancial
integration has lost in momentum considerably.139 Our results suggest that the
road to ¯nancial integration is not necessarily a one-way street: We were able to
detect an, admittedly slight, disintegration process in the period 1999 to 2001,
re°ecting the transition nature of the immediate post-EMU years.
Based on the concept of 'maximum similarity', which we introduced in this
paper as a key component of a de¯nition of ¯nancial integration, our ¯ndings
have indicated that there exist strong 'maximum similarity barriers'. It takes
extraordinary events, such as EMU, to move the degree of ¯nancial integration
beyond these barriers. The FSAP is a promising start to lowering these barriers,
yet our results call upon policymakers to move courageously on with the post-
FSAP agenda. The EU ¯nancial integration process needs new impetus and
policymakers indeed cannot fall into "reform fatigue."140
This paper re°ects from various angles that EU ¯nancial integration has pro-
gressed at varying speeds and intensities, and that changing groups of ¯nancially
more closely integrated countries have existed in the past. In light of current
and upcoming EU initiatives to promote ¯nancial integration, it seems safe to
conclude that future changes in group composition will take place. Monitoring
these changes is important. Various extensions of our study are possible. Once
data availability and reliability problems have been solved, additional price-, as
well as quantity- and news-based indicators could put the research on a broader
footing. The research could be extended to the new EU members and the ac-
cession countries. It could be performed on a global level to derive insights into
the progress of global ¯nancial integration. The results of such analyses could be
linked to the ¯nancial systems literature. In all cases, the identi¯cation of groups
of ¯nancially more closely integrated countries contributes to uncovering areas in
which ¯nancial integration is hampered by obstacles.
139These ¯ndings put a di®erent perspective to Adam et al. (2002), who conclude that "in general, convergence
accelerates after the adoption of the Euro in 1999." (Adam et al. (2002), p. 22)
140Walter (2004), p. 3.REFERENCES 37
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Appendix
A.1 Statistics of employed indicators
A.1.1 Development of indicators employed at aggregate level
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Figure 10: Development of interest rate levels: Mean rates across all countries
A.1.2 Development of cross-sectional dispersion statistics
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Figure 11: Standard deviations of interest ratesAPPENDIX ii
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Figure 12: Coe±cients of variation of interest rates
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Figure 13: Fusion curves for 1995-1996APPENDIX iii
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Figure 14: Fusion curves for 1997-2002APPENDIX iv
A.3 Descriptive statistics of group building 1995-2002
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 5.622 7.042 5.726 4.858 6.274 4.907
Standard deviation 2.371 2.654 2.393 2.204 2.505 2.215
Coe±cient of variation 0.243 0.212 0.267 0.356 0.359 0.244
Mean 9.74 12.54 8.95 6.19 6.98 9.08
G1 Mean 8.12 11.10 7.62 4.79 5.24 7.54
Variance 0.578 2.140 1.513 1.869 0.803 0.561
Standard deviation 0.760 1.463 1.230 1.367 0.896 0.749
t-value -0.681 -0.540 -0.554 -0.636 -0.692 -0.695
F-value 0.103 0.304 0.264 0.385 0.128 0.114
G2 Mean 12.43 14.93 11.16 8.53 9.87 11.65
Variance 1.118 6.652 5.290 0.156 0.308 0.243
Standard deviation 1.057 2.579 2.300 0.394 0.555 0.493
t-value 1.136 0.901 0.924 1.060 1.154 1.159
F-value 0.199 0.945 0.924 0.032 0.049 0.050
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for group building in 1995
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 6.544 8.121 5.283 3.850 5.426 1.744
Standard deviation 2.558 2.850 2.298 1.962 2.329 1.321
Coe±cient of variation 0.298 0.260 0.298 0.413 0.453 0.179
Mean 8.58 10.96 7.70 4.75 5.14 7.37
G1 Mean 6.92 9.33 6.45 3.43 3.49 6.45
Variance 1.007 3.493 2.608 0.688 0.085 0.128
Standard deviation 1.004 1.869 1.615 0.829 0.291 0.358
t-value -0.647 -0.574 -0.543 -0.670 -0.709 -0.697
F-value 0.154 0.430 0.494 0.179 0.016 0.074
G2 Mean 11.33 13.69 9.78 6.94 7.89 8.90
Variance 2.644 3.586 2.894 0.570 0.647 0.192
Standard deviation 1.626 1.894 1.701 0.755 0.804 0.438
t-value 1.078 0.957 0.905 1.117 1.181 1.162
F-value 0.404 0.442 0.548 0.148 0.119 0.110
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for group building in 1996APPENDIX v
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 3.644 4.848 2.330 1.019 2.001 0.229
Standard deviation 1.909 2.202 1.527 1.009 1.415 0.478
Coe±cient of variation 0.262 0.231 0.237 0.264 0.324 0.080
Mean 7.29 9.53 6.44 3.82 4.37 6.02
G1 Mean 6.35 8.83 5.92 3.41 3.72 5.81
Variance 0.738 2.955 1.451 0.590 0.664 0.103
Standard deviation 0.859 1.719 1.204 0.768 0.815 0.322
t-value -0.493 -0.320 -0.335 -0.406 -0.457 -0.420
F-value 0.203 0.610 0.622 0.580 0.332 0.452
G2 Mean 10.12 11.65 7.97 5.05 6.31 6.62
Variance 0.555 7.233 2.791 0.154 0.643 0.118
Standard deviation 0.745 2.689 1.671 0.392 0.802 0.343
t-value 1.479 0.961 1.004 1.217 1.372 1.259
F-value 0.152 1.492 1.197 0.151 0.321 0.514
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for group building in 1997
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 0.749 2.064 1.489 0.203 0.290 0.013
Standard deviation 0.866 1.437 1.220 0.451 0.539 0.114
Coe±cient of variation 0.140 0.170 0.214 0.136 0.137 0.024
Mean 6.16 8.45 5.70 3.33 3.92 4.75
G1 Mean 5.89 7.80 5.11 3.25 3.71 4.74
Variance 0.32 1.13 0.54 0.25 0.09 0.01
Standard deviation 0.57 1.06 0.74 0.50 0.30 0.08
t-value -0.32 -0.45 -0.48 -0.17 -0.40 -0.16
F-value 0.43 0.55 0.36 1.22 0.31 0.48
G2 Mean 5.41 10.66 7.64 2.98 3.54 4.58
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t-value -0.87 1.54 1.60 -0.76 -0.70 -1.50
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G3 Mean 7.23 8.97 6.18 3.69 4.65 4.89
Variance 0.735 2.380 2.299 0.025 0.234 0.000
Standard deviation 0.857 1.543 1.516 0.159 0.484 0.006
t-value 1.233 0.363 0.396 0.802 1.352 1.160
F-value 0.981 1.153 1.544 0.124 0.805 0.003
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for group building in 1998APPENDIX vi
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 0.200 2.728 2.036 0.301 0.000 0.008
Standard deviation 0.447 1.652 1.427 0.549 0.000 0.089
Coe±cient of variation 0.086 0.222 0.308 0.207 0.000 0.019
Mean 5.20 7.45 4.63 2.65 2.97 4.68
G1 Mean 4.99 7.75 4.93 2.26 2.97 4.73
Variance 0.036 1.915 0.718 0.033 0.000 0.002
Standard deviation 0.189 1.384 0.848 0.181 0.000 0.048
t-value -0.475 0.176 0.216 -0.701 n.a 0.502
F-value 0.178 0.702 0.353 0.109 n.a. 0.294
G2 Mean 5.46 6.10 3.40 2.52 2.97 4.72
Variance 0.077 0.541 0.423 0.019 0.000 0.0001
Standard deviation 0.278 0.735 0.651 0.137 0.000 0.011
t-value 0.582 -0.818 -0.857 -0.232 n.a. 0.425
F-value 0.387 0.198 0.208 0.063 n.a. 0.014
G3 Mean 5.98 8.27 4.25 2.97 2.97 4.61
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value 1.745 0.494 -0.261 0.578 n.a. -0.845
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G4 Mean 4.59 5.76 3.68 3.85 2.97 4.73
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value -1.357 -1.023 -0.664 2.183 n.a. 0.554
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G5 Mean 5.14 10.16 7.47 2.54 2.97 4.50
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value -0.127 1.636 1.992 -0.193 n.a. -2.064
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for group building in 1999APPENDIX vii
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 0.121 1.854 1.730 0.256 0.000 0.013
Standard deviation 0.347 1.362 1.315 0.506 0.000 0.113
Coe±cient of variation 0.056 0.167 0.228 0.149 0.000 0.021
Mean 6.20 8.18 5.77 3.40 4.39 5.50
G1 Mean 5.92 8.08 5.72 3.04 4.39 5.54
Variance 0.025 1.248 0.438 0.069 0.000 0.002
Standard deviation 0.159 1.117 0.661 0.263 0.000 0.048
t-value -0.804 -0.071 -0.037 -0.715 n.a. 0.399
F-value 0.209 0.673 0.253 0.271 n.a. 0.177
G2 Mean 6.42 7.01 4.65 3.53 4.39 5.57
Variance 0.051 1.133 1.076 0.006 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.226 1.064 1.037 0.076 0.000 0.004
t-value 0.609 -0.853 -0.853 0.256 n.a. 0.670
F-value 0.422 0.611 0.622 0.023 n.a. 0.001
G3 Mean 6.36 10.45 8.45 3.60 4.39 5.27
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value 0.442 1.670 2.032 0.386 n.a. -2.027
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G4 Mean 6.75 8.62 5.54 4.39 4.39 5.39
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value 1.558 0.323 -0.177 1.960 n.a. -0.908
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for group building in 2000APPENDIX viii
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 0.205 2.729 1.803 0.167 0.000 0.016
Standard deviation 0.452 1.652 1.343 0.408 0.000 0.128
Coe±cient of variation 0.074 0.200 0.232 0.118 0.000 0.025
Mean 6.12 8.28 5.79 3.46 4.16 5.04
G1 Mean 6.61 7.51 4.95 3.73 4.16 5.06
Variance 0.0142 1.2673 0.3096 0.2175 0.0000 0.0154
Standard deviation 0.1190 1.1257 0.5564 0.4663 0.0000 0.1240
t-value 1.0953 -0.4655 -0.6210 0.6513 n.a. 0.1929
F-value 0.0692 0.4644 0.1717 1.3057 n.a. 0.9344
G2 Mean 5.68 10.75 8.77 3.64 4.16 4.80
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value -0.961 1.499 2.217 0.438 n.a. -1.857
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G3 Mean 5.86 8.24 5.67 3.22 4.16 5.08
Variance 0.067 2.886 0.333 0.083 0.000 0.006
Standard deviation 0.259 1.699 0.577 0.288 0.000 0.080
t-value -0.581 -0.026 -0.088 -0.598 n.a. 0.320
F-value 0.329 1.057 0.185 0.498 n.a. 0.387
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 12: Descriptive statistics for group building in 2001APPENDIX ix
Group Country / Statistics N2 N3 N4 N8 M3IR Y10IR
All Variance 0.288 3.371 2.379 0.073 0.000 0.006
Standard deviation 0.536 1.836 1.542 0.271 0.000 0.080
Coe±cient of variation 0.100 0.237 0.305 0.095 0.000 0.016
Mean 5.39 7.75 5.06 2.85 3.31 4.94
G1 Mean 4.80 7.84 4.62 2.92 3.31 4.99
Variance 0.059 4.642 0.140 0.022 0.000 0.001
Standard deviation 0.242 2.155 0.374 0.150 0.000 0.023
t-value -1.096 0.049 -0.284 0.259 n.a. 0.579
F-value 0.204 1.377 0.059 0.306 n.a. 0.082
G2 Mean 5.72 6.54 4.48 2.66 3.31 4.97
Variance 0.057 0.486 1.360 0.055 0.000 0.005
Standard deviation 0.239 0.697 1.166 0.234 0.000 0.070
t-value 0.614 -0.658 -0.375 -0.699 n.a. 0.329
F-value 0.198 0.144 0.572 0.747 n.a. 0.755
G3 Mean 6.02 8.14 4.65 3.32 3.31 4.86
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value 1.180 0.213 -0.261 1.745 n.a. -0.988
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
G4 Mean 5.53 10.71 8.51 2.73 3.31 4.80
Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-value 0.265 1.614 2.238 -0.423 n.a. -1.738
F-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.000
Source: Own illustration, own calculations.
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for group building in 2002 
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